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Abstract: This paper examines magnitudes and business cycle dynamics of social security 
contributions (SSC). In most OECD countries studied, we document a negative covariation of 
payroll tax burdens with GDP and GDP growth at business cycle and lower frequencies. We 
assess the overall magnitude of the distortion following Barro and Redlick (2011). For most 
countries, average marginal SSC tax rates exceed average rates, but the latter tracks the former 
tightly. Changes in average payroll tax burdens are mostly accounted for by changes in tax 
schedules rather than shifts in the earnings distribution over time. For many countries, SSC 
rates behave like estimated values of the “labor wedge” (Chari et al. 2007, Brinca et al., 2016).  
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Throughout the developed world, social insurance programs – including unemployment 
benefits, work disability insurance programs, health insurance, old-age pensions as well as other 
programs aimed at social inclusion – redistribute a significant share of a country's national 
income. This redistribution is financed to a large part by social security contributions (SSC).  
Representing more than half of the total tax on labor income in OECD member countries, SSC 
are little different from dedicated payroll taxes, and dominate the difference between 
employers’ costs of labor and the direct monetary benefit received by workers. In 2013, total 
SSC in OECD countries amounted to about $4.4 trillion, or about 9 percent of GDP; in some 
economies, social security contributions represented as much as 19 percent of a country’s GDP, 
or 40 percent of total labor compensation. Even if workers perceive these contributions as 
paying for realized or potential benefits in social security programs, SSC or payroll taxes remain 
likely to represent a significant distortion in the worker-firm relationship.1  
This paper investigates the cyclical behavior of social security contributions in 25 
OECD countries over the period 1960-2015. To our knowledge, the origins and the dynamics 
of SSC over the business cycle have yet to be systematically studied.2 We document that for a 
majority of countries and time intervals, average SSC rates (defined as the total SSC divided 
by total gross labor compensation) vary counter-cyclically with respect to growth and output, 
especially at business cycle frequencies, declining in booms and rising in recessions. This 
feature is not shared by all countries, especially those in which the value-added tax and other 
sources of general revenue cross-subsidize social security budgets. Because payroll taxation 
                                                            
1Gruber (1997) argues that labor supply may be higher despite lower take-home pay and offset the distortion if 
workers associate payroll taxes with additional forms of compensation, i.e. health care, pension, unemployment 
and disability, as well as other forms of insurance not offered in the market; yet there is no reason to expect this 
offset to be perfect.   
2Burda and Weder (2016) report similar regularities in a smaller group of countries; see also Gali et al. (2007) and 




represents the average burden of a worker-job match in a frictional labor market, this cyclicality 
has potentially important implications for labor market dynamics.3  
There are two prominent sources of cyclical variation in aggregate payroll taxation. 
First, holding tax schedules constant, shifts in the distribution of gross labor earnings change 
the SSC burden relative to the wage bill if, for example, the tax schedule consists of different 
piecewise linear brackets. Second, “Bismarckian” balanced budget principles applied to social 
funds may require adjustment of the tax schedule to meet revenue shortfalls in recessions and 
trim surpluses in booms. In order to quantify the relative importance of these two alternatives, 
we propose an accounting framework for decomposing movements in average SSC rates. We 
find that the lion’s share of observed changes in annual average contributions rates is directly 
attributable to adjustments in statutory tax schedules. Following Barro and Redlick (2011) we 
show that these average tax burdens co-vary with effective marginal tax rates, with the latter 
exceeding the former in almost all cases. In many countries, our estimates are also correlated 
with estimates of the “labor wedge” or labor market distortion described by Chari et al (2007) 
and Brinca et al. (2016) in their business cycle accounting framework.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and long-run 
observations. Section 3 discusses long-term characteristics of social security contributions in 
our sample. Section 4 presents empirical findings on cyclical properties of contribution rates 
and evaluates the sources of this behavior at cyclical and lower frequencies. Section 5 examines 
the behavior of the SSC tax burden in the context of the business cycle accounting framework 
of Chari, et al. (2007).  Section 6 concludes. 
                                                            
3As discussed below in more detail, the possibility that this distortion may fluctuate over time may offer an account 
of cyclical variation of output and employment at business cycle frequencies (see Chari, et al. 2007). Burda and 
Weder (2016) show that a countercyclical payroll tax burden driven by a balanced budget constraint can help 
explain the Hall-Shimer anomaly. Voigts (2015) shows that the nominal incidence of social security contributions 
for households and firms in model with nominal rigidities can overturn tax liability equivalence and significantly 




2. Data description and trends 
2.1 Average contribution (payroll tax) rates 
We construct our standard measure of average social security contributions paid by 
firms and workers expressed as a fraction of total wage costs (henceforth: SSC rate) using two 
time series published by the OECD.4 These annual data from 25 advanced countries range from 
1960 to 2015. The first times series, “Social Security Contributions Received by General 
Government,” includes contributions to pension funds, disability and health insurance, as well 
as unemployment insurance and related programs.5 The second series is “Compensation of 
Employees”, defined as the sum of wages, salaries and social insurance contributions paid by 
employers directly or on behalf of their employees.  
Table 1 displays the size of SSC relative both to GDP and overall labor compensation 
in 2015 and shows that they are significant in OECD economies. In most European countries, 
social contribution comprise 10-20% of GDP and as much as 30% and more of total labor 
compensation, but less than 5% of GDP or 10% of total labor compensation in the US, Canada 
and New Zealand.6 Since we are interested in the size of labor market distortions, we focus only 
on the sum of employer and employee contributions, and exclude personal income taxes and 
indirect taxation (e.g. value-added  taxes), that affect real household income deriving from 
market activities in general. The first and second columns summarize the size of the labor 
                                                            
4OECD Economic Outlook 95 (2015).  
5Households can make social security payments to the government or a governmental or non-government agency, 
or even private social security funds, with a breakdown which varies across countries. Transfers to non-government 
funds are not included in our measure. For example, in the Netherlands, private disability insurance is not included 
in government social security receipts (See OECD 2007 in Data Sources). We repeated our analysis for several 
countries using social security payments by households and obtained very similar results. 
6Because we only analyze contributions into social security systems and not payments that employees receive from 





wedge and the magnitude of the distortion, while the significance of the social security system 
in a particular country is captured in the third column.  
<Table 1 here> 
 
Let At denote the average SSC rate in year t, given by the ratio of total social security 
contributions to the wage bill – the sum of all wages, salaries and non-wage payments made by 
employers on behalf of employees:  
tt
A
t billwageSSC /                                                             (1) 
While the OECD computes similar indicators, ours aggregates over all households and includes 
both employer and employee SSC payments.7 Assuming that workers and firms take such 
payments into account when entering into an employment contract, A may be thought of as the 
unconditional average SSC rate faced by a worker-employer match and the ex-ante 
distortionary burden on the value of a firm-worker match. Figure 1 presents A for all countries 
in our sample and reveals significant heterogeneity across the OECD in level, trend and cyclical 
behavior.  
<Figure 1 here> 
2.2 Marginal payroll tax rates  
The average SSC rates displayed in Figure 1 and in the first column of Table 1 do not 
necessarily provide a fully accurate measure of the distortionary impact of labor taxes, because they 
do not represent the true marginal tax burden arising from payroll taxation. To measure this, Barro 
                                                            
7The OECD constructs “Average rate of employees’ social security contributions’’ and “Average rate of 
employers’ social security contributions’’ for eight different household types. See: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AWCOMP# Both OECD indicators are calculated starting from 




and Sahasalul (1983, 1986) and Barro and Redlick (2011) construct average marginal tax rate series 
for US workers (see also Joines 1981 and Seater 1982), which represent a weighted central tendency 
of marginal payroll taxation for individuals over various points of the earnings distribution in the 
economy. The weights measure the relative importance of a particular individual.8 Not having 
access to individual data, we construct series of average marginal SSC rates using a different 
procedure with two different OECD data sources.  
The first OECD database, “Taxing Wages 2016,” covers 32 countries from 1981 to 2015 and 
provides annual data for each country’s SSC tax schedule, including tax brackets and respective 
rates for non-linear schedules.9 Almost all countries in our sample have separate tax schemes for 
employers and employees; for our purposes, marginal rates for corresponding tax brackets on either 
side are simply added together, resulting in a consolidated payroll tax schedule for the worker-firm 
match.10 SSC schedules differ considerably across OECD countries in our sample: In 2015, 
Belgium, Hungary, Greece, Finland, New Zealand and Slovenia had a flat payroll tax schedule, 
while Iceland, Denmark and Spain use lump-sum payments or fixed minimum contributions for all 
workers. The remaining countries in the sample have progressive or regressive tax schemes with 
different marginal SSC rates applied to different levels of earnings. In 2015, 9 of 25 countries 
covered by our dataset capped social security contributions at some earnings level above which the 
marginal SSC rates is zero. Countries with a maximum taxable level of income include Austria, 
Canada, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Slovak Republic and Spain.11 Figure 2 
displays SSC tax schedules for six representative countries in 2015, with level of labor 
                                                            
8Barro and Sahasakul (1983) use shares of individual consumption in aggregate consumption as weights, other 
approach might be income-weighted or population-weighted averages.  
9Our dataset and detailed descriptions of the social security systems are available on request.   
10This procedure ignores lump-sum payments and fixed minimum contributions. These payments are independent 
of the business cycle and, presumably do not distort the labor supply margin. We also ignore the fact that in some 
countries tax schedules vary depending on the family status. For this reason, some countries (e.g. Norway) were 
excluded from our dataset. All threshold values for annual earnings are reported an https://www.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de/de/professuren/vwl/wtm2/mitarbeiter/burda/ssc_schedules_data.zip 
11In the United States, a tax ceiling applies to all social security contributions except those for Medicare, which 




compensation subject to social security contributions on the horizontal axis, and the corresponding 
marginal SSC rate applied on the vertical axis.12 
<Figure 2 here>  
The second OECD database used in for constructing the average marginal SSC taxation 
series is “Distribution of gross earnings of full-time employees.”13 This database comprises 
annual observations of nine wage deciles of the gross earnings distribution of full-time 
employees in 27 OECD countries for 1975-2010 (in hourly, weekly, monthly or annual rates 
depending on the country). We apply schedules of statutory contributions to standardized 
annual earnings at each of the ith deciles i1,2,…9} of contemporaneous earnings distributions 
(net of employers’ contributions) and arrive at a marginal tax rate it (i.e. the SSC tax rate 
applicable to an additional unit of gross compensation at a particular decile). An unweighted 
average over the nine marginal rates yields the following “average marginal tax rate”  
	
∑ . For a given year and country, observations can be constructed only if data for both the 
tax schedule and wage distribution are available. For 10 countries in our OECD sample, this 
requirement is satisfied for 10 years or more. Figure 3 displays the time series of average 
marginal rates (red dashed lines), as well as average SSC rates described in Section 1 (blue 
solid lines). In all countries except Canada and Japan, average marginal rates are higher than 
the average SSC tax burden. The reason is that aggregate consolidated tax schedules are 
regressive (and/or truncated) in most countries as evident from Figure 2, so low-income workers 
tend to face the highest marginal rates. The results suggest that average rates payroll tax rates 
understate the distortionary effect of SSC, despite the regressivity of the schedules for any given 
worker in most countries.   
                                                            
12Figure 7 shows the evolution of tax schedules over time for the exemplary cases of France and Germany.  




<Figure 3 here>  
 The following simple example illustrates how this is possible. A population consists of 
three families, with gross labor earnings of 20,000, 60,000, and 200,000 respectively. These 
families face a truncated SSC schedule that levies a uniform 30% tax on gross income up to 
61,000, but 0% on income exceeding 61,000. The average SSC tax rate A is 
(0.3*20,000+0.3*60,000+0.3*61,000)/(20,000+60,000+200,000) = 15.1%, significantly below 
the average marginal rate  of (0.3+0.3+0)/3 = 20%.  
Figure 3 shows that in most countries, the average SSC tax rate A moves closely with 
our measure of marginal SSC rates, representing an average impact of statutory rates at the 
margin for nine representative earners. For each country, correlations between the two are 
presented above the panels of the graph and support this assessment. The average tax rate 
appears to be a good rough indicator of levels and especially changes in the marginal distortion 
for the average marginal tax rate, or the tax rate relevant for labor supply decisions.  
2.3. Tracking the origins of changes in average marginal tax rates  
 The rich detail on payroll tax schedules available from the OECD allows us to explore 
sources of variation in A over time. First, the average tax burden can shift if tax schedules are 
changes. Movements in marginal rates or contribution ceilings can have large effects on 
aggregate contributions actually paid. Second, the distribution of earnings itself may change, 
implying higher rates applied to marginal income, or lower rates if marginal income lies above 
the cutoff threshold income level. This shift need not only involve the first moment of the 
distribution, because changes in variance or higher moments can also matter for the overall tax 




growth, so one family earns 22,000, one earns 66,000, and one earns 220,000.14 The average 
tax rate is now (0.3*22,000+0.3*61,000+0.3*61,000)/(22,000+66,000+220,000)≈14%, while 
the average marginal rate falls to (0.3+0+0)/3=10%.  
 
3.  Trend and cyclical properties of SSC rates  
3.1. Low frequency movements 
 Before considering business cycle frequency properties of our constructed series in 
Section 3, we examine the medium to long trends in the average social security contributions 
rate. It is instructive to begin with the case of Germany, the largest EU economy with an 
extensive social security system financed to a large extent by SSC. Figure 4 shows that, over a 
half-century, Germany experienced a secular rise in A of almost 15 percentage points, reaching 
a peak in 1998. This rise has been reversed somewhat since then, especially after 2003-5, the 
years of the Hartz labor market reforms. The rises in A coincide with periods of economic 
downturn or structural change (the two oil crises of the 1970s and the German reunification 
episode).  
<Figure 4 here> 
 
The hypothesis that growth downturns are followed by increases in A finds support in 
many of the countries examined in this study. Figure 5 presents cross-correlograms up to order 
10 for the annual data of the countries with sufficient observations for leads and lags of annual 
growth of GDP Y (approximated as lnYt) with At+i for i = -10,-9,…0,…+9, +10). The most 
salient finding is a robust statistical significance of negative correlations of current lnYt with 
                                                            




At+i for i>0 (future payroll tax rates) of the continental European countries Austria, Belgium, 
France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden as well as their “Bismarckian offshoots” Japan, South Korea 
and the United States. The correlation of rates with future output, while negative in these 
countries, is less strong and consistent. In contrast, countries with insurance programs in the 
tradition of Beveridge (the UK, Canada, Australian, and New Zealand) show little or no 
covariation.15 This raises the general suspicion that the SSC rates are driven by economic 
conditions. A leading hypothesis is that rising wage bills make more resources available for 
redistribution purposes, possibly inducing governments to cut payroll tax rates in good times to 
compensate for low profitability in recessions. 
<Figure 5 here> 
 
Policies that reinforce distortions in downturns have potentially severe consequences for 
allocative efficiency. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) present evidence that labor taxation is a first 
order cause of high unemployment in OECD economics at low frequencies; SSC are an obvious  
candidate for a driver of the labor wedge in the sense of Chari et al. (2007, 2016) and possibly 
represent a “smoking gun” linking the labor wedge directly to business cycle dynamics.   
3.2. Cyclical properties of SSC rates 
 The findings presented in Figure 4, while relatively unambiguous for some countries, 
may be confounded by low-frequency trends in the data. During the sample period, growth 
exhibited a downward trend while the scope of social insurance programs was expanded across 
the OECD, so strong negative correlations may be spurious due to common, low-frequency 
trends. In this section, we report results for several detrending procedures and study the 
association at business-cycle frequencies corresponding to a periodicity of 2-7 years. We also 
                                                            
15Several economies seem to have undergone regime shifts over the 50 year interval. Burda and Weder (2016) find 
that over the period 1970-2010, the Netherlands and Sweden appear to have switched from a Bismarck-style 




examine the robustness of correlations over the sample for signs of potential sub-sample 
instability. 
Table 2 provides a first account of these dynamics. The first two columns show the 
average level of the SSC rate over the two sub-periods, while the third and fourth columns 
present coefficients of variation over those same sub-periods. For roughly half the countries, 
average payroll tax burdens have increased, sometimes significantly, as in Germany. The last 
two columns present correlations of HP-filtered trend deviation of average SSC rates and the 
natural log of output for the two subsamples as well as the entire period. Over the entire interval, 
the results roughly confirm the split identified in the previous section between continental 
European countries with negative correlations (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany) 
versus the Beveridge countries (UK, the Scandinavian countries, the US, the Netherlands, 
Italy). The subperiod correlations suggest regime shifts for the US, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Iceland, South Korea and Spain. Of these, only Sweden and the Netherlands moved from a 
Bismarck to the Beveridge paradigm. The US seems to have moved in the opposite direction.  
<Table 2 here> 
The HP filter has been criticized for inducing spurious cyclicality (e.g. King and Rebelo, 
1993, Cogley and Nason, 1995). To examine the robustness of our findings to detrending 
method, we compute the correlations using first differences and the band-pass filter (Burnside 
and Christiano, Fitzgerald, 2003) with lower and upper periodicity bounds of (2, 8) and (3, 7), 
returning components with frequencies in the interval /4, ] and 2/7, 2/3], respectively. 
The results for the sampling interval 1960-2012 are collected in Table 3. To facilitate 
comparison between correlations derived under different filtering methods, the last column 





<Table 3 here> 
Table 4 repeats the analysis for different filters, but with SSC rates leading or lagging 
one period. We report dynamic correlations because a reaction of SSC rates to business cycle 
fluctuations may be delayed, especially if due to adjustments in the tax schedule; policy changes 
might be subject to decision as well as to data collection lags. In most countries, the lead of 
average SSC rates is indeed strongly countercyclical, and this finding is robust to the detrending 
method. For Germany, the UK, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway and Canada, dynamic 
correlations for one period ahead average SSC rates are negative and even stronger than 
contemporaneous correlations. For the UK, the Czech Republic and Denmark, the 
contemporaneous correlation is positive (see Table 2), while the correlation between GDP in 
period t and the average SSC rate in the subsequent period is negative. Italy and Norway appear 
to have a positive co-movement of average SSC rates and the log of GDP both 
contemporaneously and with average SSC rate lead one period. In the US, the contemporaneous 
correlation becomes negative after 1990, as we pointed out in the context of Table 2. Correlation 
of SSC rate lead and GDP is positive, however, when the entire time period is considered.  
<Table 4 here> 
We conclude that average SSC rates are counter-cyclical for many, but not all OECD 
countries. This dynamic pattern of social security contributions implies that the distortionary 
wedge between labor costs of a firm and the net wage received by a worker worsens in business 
cycle downturns. The social security system may thus amplify business cycle shocks through 
the economy. Equally striking are the strong negative correlations of SSC rates with output at 
lower frequencies than those associated with the business cycle, a finding consistent with 





4.  Deconstructing the Mechanism: Reasons for cyclical SSC rates 
Time variation in average SSC employment burdens observed in Figures 1 and 3 can 
arise from two sources. First, statutory tax schedules are adjusted in response to revenue needs 
over time, either as changes in a single tax rate in the case of a flat tax schedule, or several tax 
brackets and corresponding rates in the case of a non-linear schedule. Second, holding tax 
brackets and cutoffs constant, the distribution of labor earnings can change over time, altering 
tax revenues in the process. To see how variability in the wage distribution affects the average 
SSC rate, consider a regressive tax schedule as found in Germany, France or Spain, displayed 
in Figure 2. An overall increase in gross earnings during an expansion moves a larger fraction 
of taxable income into brackets with lower tax rates, so the average tax rate declines. 
Furthermore, if the tax schedule features a cut-off or threshold value of taxable income (as in 
Germany, Netherlands or Spain), a surge in gross earnings implies that a higher fraction of total 
gross compensation may exceed this threshold and be exempt at the margin. Similarly, a decline 
in earnings during a downturn means that a larger fraction of gross labor income falls into lower 
tax brackets with higher marginal tax rates (or lies below a cut-off value), so the average SSC 
rate is higher. Since tax schedules are not strictly linear for most countries in our sample, 
variability in the wage distribution is a potentially important driver for the observed variability 
in average SSC rates.   
In this section we assess the relative importance of the statutory tax rates versus income 
changes as sources of variation in SSC. To this end, we decompose changes in average SSC 
rates faced by nine representative earners into two components: one the first captures changes 
solely due to adjustments in tax schedules, while the other is due to shifts in earnings 
distributions. We begin by constructing series of social security contributions by combining our 
dataset on tax schedules with data on gross labor earnings distributions. Again, we consider 




distribution as reported by the OECD. In each period t, social security contributions paid by 
worker i with gross labor earnings Wi,t are given by  





,min)0(  ,                                     (2) 
where k1,…,K indexes tax brackets of the SSC schedule k,t, Bk,t} stipulating tax rate k,t 
applied to labor income greater than Bk-1,t but less than Bk,t, where B0,t = 0 and I(.) is the indicator 
function.16 For this earner, Ai,t = SSCi,t/Wi,t. We define the economy-wide synthetic indicator 
A* of average payroll taxation over the nine deciles as the unweighted average of nine average 
rates: 








t                                                                                   (3) 
In contrast to the average SSC rate A computed in Section 2,  A* is a synthetic average tax 
burden constructed from tax schedule and gross earnings data. Differences are due to 
aggregation of wage distribution information into deciles, and because the uppermost decile is 
missing. 
As the two measures track each other fairly well, the decomposition allows us to track 
year-to-year changes  ∆ ∗ as the sum of two components. The first, ∆  (S for “statutory”), is 
due to changes in the tax code between period t-1 and t applied to the distribution of earnings 
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The second component ∆  (D for “distribution”) is a residual, comprised of changes in the 
earnings distribution at the tax structure in period t-1, plus second order effects due to possible 
interaction of tax schedules and earnings changes: ∆ ≡ ∆ ∗ ∆ . 
Plots of implied sources of changes in A* are presented for the 10 countries in Figure 
6. Evidently, policy adjustments in tax schedules are the dominant source of year-to-year 
changes in average SSC rates. For France, the wage component appears to offset the statutory 
component before 1990. After this point, the SSC tax follows the policy component closely. 
Similar patterns can be observed in the other countries. Table 5 additionally presents average 
absolute changes of actual average SSC rates, the component due to policy changes and a 
residual due to changes in the structure of earnings. The results show that average rates of 
changes in SSC rates are close to changes in policy components. In Austria, France and the UK, 
changes in policy component are even stronger than the total change. The change due to the 
movements in the wage distribution and residual counteract the changes due to policy and 
mitigate the total change. Judging from the relative magnitudes, we conclude that policy 
component is a primary source for the total change in average SSC rates.17    
<Figure 6 here>  
<Table 5 here>  
5. Interpreting SSC rates as a labor wedge 
We have demonstrated a strong correlation of our SSC tax burden measure with output, 
both at business cycle and lower frequencies. Naturally, correlation is not causation, and a 
number of third factors might lie behind the macroeconomic co-movements. Yet any plausible 
                                                            
17This claim is corroborated by unreported individual regressions of changes in overall average SSC rates (A) 
on S and D respectively, in the spirit of columns (3) and (5) in Table 5. R2’s for statutory rate changes are 
lower, sometimes significantly so, but with the exception of Austria always exceed the fraction of variance that 




explanation for a rise of average SSC rates displayed in Figure 1 during economic downturns 
must appeal to some combination of 1) decline in employment and/or the wage bill, 2) a rise in 
productivity and GDP relative to the wage bill, and 3) a reaction of the tax structure to 
compensate for the lost revenue. The role of the last channel is substantiated by our analysis of 
average statutory marginal tax rates, which also move upwards in recessions.  
Crucial to any causal mechanism, however, is the role of labor costs in explaining 
economic downturns. We conclude our analysis by comparing the properties of SSC rates with 
Chari et al.’s (2007) measure of the labor wedge in their “business cycle accounting” framework 
for countries with sufficiently long series. This decomposition attributes components of 
deviations of realized GDP to four distortions from a path implied by some theoretical Ramsey-
Cass-Koopmans growth path. Chari et al. (2007) show that several broad classes of 
macroeconomic models can be mapped into four types of deviations from a putative steady 
state. While the method itself is not uncontroversial, it would seem that our measure of SSC 
rates should correspond, conceptually, to the labor market distortion described by Chari et al. 
(2007) and Brinca et al. (2016) as the “labor wedge”.  
Table 6 presents correlations of our average SSC rates and the labor wedge, which we 
compute using the now-standard business cycle accounting procedure (Chari, et al. 2007) and 
represents the discrepancy between marginal product of labor and a marginal rate of substitution 
of consumption for leisure. The first column shown correlation coefficients between average 
SSC rates and labor wedges computed with our data directly from first order conditions. For 
most of the countries examined, the correlation is positive and significant. This is especially 
true for the countries with countercyclical SSC rates: Germany, UK, Greece, Finland, Japan, 
Belgium, Ireland, Poland, Canada, South Korea, Iceland and Spain. Countries with procyclical 




Hungary, Norway, and Czech Republic18. The second column presents correlation coefficients 
between our measure of average SSC rates and labor wedges taken from Brinca et al. (2016). 
A different method for computing the labor wedge as well as a different time span result in 
slightly different numbers. However, for UK, Finland, Belgium, South Korea, Iceland and 
Spain we still get a high positive correlation. The evidence strongly suggests that SSC taxes 
embody an important labor market distortion of the type readily described by Chari et al. (2007) 
and Brinca et al. (2016).  
<Table 6 here>  
6. Conclusion  
To the extent that the business accounting framework has economic content, it should 
be possible to identify empirical counterparts to the distortions or “wedges” which prevent the 
representative agent from achieving the idealized path associated with the neoclassical growth 
model. We have identified social security contributions as one highly salient and measurable 
distortion in the labor market that qualify as the empirical counterpart of the labor market 
distortion or “wedge.” Social security contributions rates co-move negatively with the business 
cycle in the majority of economies, especially in those in which social insurance is financed 
along the lines of Bismarckian principles. In good times when social insurance funds are flush 
with cash, contribution rates are cut; in bad times, rates are increased. Models of business cycle 
fluctuations that attribute a significant role to endogenous propagation arising from labor 
market distortions should thus directly model dynamics of the payroll tax as an important, if 
not central component of that mechanism. Models capable of explaining low frequency 
                                                            
18 We also computed a simplified version of the “government consumption wedge” and “efficiency wedge” (Chari, et al. 2007). 
Average SSC rates are negatively correlated with the efficiency wedge and positively correlated with the government spending 
wedge. Similar correlations for Sweden are reported by Brinca (2013). Gali et al. (2007) and Hall (1997) discuss the 
countercyclical nature of labor wedge, while Mulligan (1998, 2002) presents evidence that federal labor tax and labor wedge 




fluctuations of unemployment are in short supply and the payroll tax mechanism appears to be 
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Appendix: Data Sources 
 
OECD: “Economic Outlook”, Volume 2015 issue 2, source; http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-outlook-volume-2015-issue-2_eco_outlook-v2015-2-
en 
OECD: “Taxing wages 2016”, source: http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-
database.htm#ssc 
OECD: “Sickness and Disability Schemes in the Netherlands”, Country memo as a background 
paper for the OECD Disability Review. November 2007, source: 
http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/41429917.pdf 
OECD: “LFS - Minimum wages and gross earning of full employees”. source: 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/lfs-minimumwagesandgrossearningsoffull-
timeemployees.htm 
Eurostat: Taxation trends in the European Union Data for the EU Member States, Iceland and 
Norway, Statistical book, Eurostat 2014, source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_analy
sis/tax_structures/2014/report.pdf 
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Figure 2: SSC schedules in 2015, six countries 
 
 a) Low threshold SSC funding systems    
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b) High threshold SSC funding systems   
 
        
























































































Figure 5: Cross-correlations of real growth and SSC rates 














Source: Authors’ calculations 
Figure 5 (continued): Cross-correlations of real growth and SSC rates 















Figure 5 (continued): Cross-correlations of real growth and SSC rates 















Figure 5 (continued): Cross-correlations of real growth and SSC rates 















































































































































Note: Red bars denote changes in average SSC rates due to changes in the tax code, holding the distribution 
of earnings constant. Blue bars denote the changes in average payroll taxation implied by changes in the 
earnings distribution, defined as average SSC implied by the nine deciles of the distribution minus percentage 
change due to changes in the tax code.












































     




Table 1: Dimension of social security systems in 2015 (%) 
 
Country 
SSC as %  
of GDP 
SSC as % of wage 
bill (SSC rate, A) 
SSC as % 
of taxes 
USA   7.4 12.5 23.7 
Canada   5.4   9.4 15.3 
New Zealand   1.1   2.2   0.0 
Germany 18.0 32.6 37.9 
Sweden  3.7  7.8 22.5 
France 19.7 36.3 37.1 
Netherlands 15.2 30.0 37.7 
United Kingdom   8.0 15.7 18.6 
Denmark   1.1   1.9   0.1 
Greece 13.2 41.4 29.0 
Finland 14.4 26.3 29.0 
Hungary 18.4 32.0 33.3 
Japan 12.5 25.9 n.a. 
Belgium 16.7 32.8 31.9 
Italy 14.1 33.6 30.2 
Ireland   4.7 14.5   9.7 
Austria 16.8 32.0 34.0 
Switzerland   6.8 11.5 24.6 
Norway 10.2 21.9 27.4 
Poland 14.5 36.6 n.a. 
Slovak Republic 14.5 36.5 42.8 
Czech Republic 15.5 36.5 43.3 
South Korea   8.2 18.5 n.a. 
Iceland    6.3   6.9 16.6 
Spain   12.4 25.9 33.7 





Table 2: Average SSC rates: Means, standard deviations  
and cyclical correlations, 1960-2015* 
 
Country 
Average SSC tax 
rate (A) 
 Standard deviation 
 of A (%) 
 Correlation of HP-filtered A    
with HP-filtered GDP* 
 1960-90   1991-2015    1960-1990 1991-2015  1960-1990 1991-2015 1960-2015 
USA 0.09 0.12  2.3 0.4    0.31 -0.20  0.10 
Germany 0.28 0.34  2.3 1.5  -0.61 -0.48 -0.53 
Sweden 0.09 0.10  2.9 2.5  -0.38 0.07 -0.06 
France 0.31 0.36  4.9 1.9  -0.19 -0.28 -0.23 
Netherlands 0.30 0.30  4.2 1.9  -0.50  0.22 -0.06 
United Kingdom 0.13 0.15  1.6 0.8  -0.47  0.22 -0.27 
Denmark 0.02 0.03  0.6 0.7  -0.11  0.25  0.07 
Greece n.a. 0.37  n.a. 2.0  n.a. -0.32 -0.32 
Finland 0.15 0.26  5.4 1.8  -0.45 -0.11 -0.31 
Hungary n.a. 0.30  n.a. 1.6  n.a.  0.43  0.43 
Japan 0.11 0.21  2.9 3.2  -0.28  0.27 -0.08 
Belgium 0.26 0.32  3.3 0.6  -0.72 -0.60 -0.66 
Italy 0.29 0.34  2.1 1.6   0.07 -0.07  0.01 
Ireland n.a. 0.14  0.0 0.8  n.a. -0.28 -0.30 
Austria 0.25 0.32  2.8 1.1  -0.38 -0.50 -0.44 
Switzerland n.a. 0.12  0.0 0.5  n.a. -0.10 -0.10 
Norway 0.23 0.21 1.4 0.5 0.24 -0.19 0.15
Poland n.a. 0.33  n.a. 2.3  n.a. -0.15 -0.15 
Slovak Republic n.a. 0.35  n.a. 1.7  n.a. -0.27 -0.27 
Canada 0.07 0.09  0.8 0.3  -0.28 -0.26 -0.28 
Czech Republic n.a. 0.37  n.a. 0.7  n.a.  0.29  0.29 
New Zealand 0.02 0.03  0.9 0.5  -0.41 -0.08 -0.09 
South Korea 0.03 0.12  2.1 4.0  -0.12 -0.82 -0.47 
Iceland  0.02 0.06  0.2 1.0  -0.39 -0.62 -0.57 
Spain 0.21 0.26  5.0 0.5  -0.50 -0.47 -0.47 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 95 and authors’ calculations 
 
Note: Data series start form 1960 or from the earliest available year.  








Table 3: Correlation between average SSC rates and log-output 1960*-2015 




 Diff  
   
  BP 
 (2,8) 
  BP 
 (3,7)           
                   Range 
 HP          Diff      BP(2,8)  BP(3,7) 
USA  0.10  0.20  0.07  0.02  
Germany -0.52 -0.19 -0.50 -0.52  
Sweden -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05  
France -0.23  0.02 -0.01  0.01  
Netherlands -0.06 -0.06  0.17  0.03  
United Kingdom -0.27 -0.17 -0.32 -0.22  
Denmark  0.07  0.06  0.26  0.13  
Greece -0.32 -0.37 -0.05 -0.12  
Finland -0.31 -0.26 -0.01  0.11  
Hungary  0.43  0.10  0.54  0.63  
Japan -0.08 -0.21 -0.05 -0.15  
Belgium -0.66 -0.50 -0.56 -0.56  
Italy  0.01  0.01  0.09  0.12  
Ireland -0.30 -0.30  0.09  0.36  
Austria -0.44 -0.29 -0.34 -0.27  
Switzerland -0.10 -0.36  0.22  0.44  
Norway  0.15  0.17  0.32  0.42  
Poland -0.15 -0.22  0.10  0.29  
Slovak Republic -0.27 -0.28 -0.01  0.03  
Canada -0.28 -0.21 -0.16 -0.48  
Czech Republic  0.29  0.21  0.33  0.34  
New Zealand -0.09 -0.23 -0.17 -0.43  
South Korea -0.47 -0.42 -0.50 -0.69  
Iceland  -0.57 -0.51 -0.47 -0.46  
Spain -0.47 -0.16 -0.25 -0.32  
Notes: HP=data detrended using Hodrick Prescott filter; Diff: =first differenced data; BP= data detrended using the band-
pass filter with lower and upper periodicity parameters (x,y). 





Table 4: Dynamic correlation between average SSC rates and log-output 1960*-2015 
Country HP-Filter, =6.25 First Differences Band-Pass Filter,    
l= 2 years,u=8 years 
 (t-1,yt) (t+1,yt) (t-1,yt) (t+1,yt) (t-1,yt) (t+1,yt) 
USA -0.26  0.17 -0.16  0.14 -0.38  0.24 
Germany -0.08 -0.54  0.11 -0.21  0.02 -0.53 
Sweden -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.11  0.08 
France -0.01 -0.14  0.15  0.08  0.02  0.14 
Netherlands  0.08 -0.39 -0.09 -0.35  0.23 -0.25 
United Kingdom  0.08 -0.45 -0.01 -0.28  0.06 -0.46 
Denmark  0.29 -0.15  0.31 -0.04  0.48 -0.05 
Greece  0.09 -0.52 -0.22 -0.52  0.40 -0.52 
Finland -0.23 -0.29 -0.22 -0.23 -0.05 -0.01 
Hungary -0.24  0.42 -0.38  0.08 -0.30  0.45 
Japan  0.06 -0.20 -0.14 -0.32 -0.01 -0.07 
Belgium -0.05 -0.29  0.09 -0.15  0.21 -0.03 
Italy -0.08  0.06 -0.01  0.03 -0.13  0.23 
Ireland -0.20 -0.08 -0.25 -0.24  0.16  0.06 
Austria  0.10 -0.30  0.11 -0.06  0.24 -0.11 
Switzerland -0.17 -0.02 -0.25 -0.10  0.06  0.33 
Norway -0.15  0.20  0.00  0.15 -0.14  0.42 
Poland -0.03 -0.17 -0.09 -0.16  0.22 -0.04 
Slovak Republic -0.26 -0.19 -0.29 -0.30 -0.24  0.17 
Canada  0.04 -0.40  0.04 -0.32  0.12 -0.17 
Czech Republic  0.42 -0.22  0.36 -0.34  0.48 -0.32 
New Zealand  0.42 -0.12  0.24 -0.17  0.58 -0.56 
South Korea -0.08 -0.05 -0.28 -0.21 -0.15  0.12 
Iceland  -0.29 -0.40 -0.32 -0.36  0.02 -0.44 
Spain -0.07 -0.26  0.01  0.04  0.26 -0.09 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 95 and authors’ calculations 
Note: (xt-i,yt) denotes simple correlation between time dated variables xt-i and yt. SSC rates and log of real GDP were HP-









Mean absolute  




value of ∆  
over period
(3)  
% of var(∆ ∗) 




value of ∆     
over period 
(5) 
% of var(∆ ∗) 
accounted for 
by ∆  
Austria  (1988-2009) 0.73 0.70   96.3  0.13 3.9 
Belgium  (1984-2008) 0.58 0.58 100.0   0.00 0.0 
Canada  (1990-2010) 0.31 0.33   98.6  0.15 8.5 
Finland  (2000-2009) 0.65 0.65 100.0  0.00 0.0 
France  (1982-2006) 0.91 1.06   98.2  0.20 3.3 
Germany  (1991-2009) 0.66 0.67   98.3  0.11 0.2 
Japan  (2000-2010) 1.31 1.31 100.0  0.00 0.0 
Poland  (1992-2008) 2.25 2.25   100.0  0.00 0.0 
UK  (1982-2010) 0.90 1.02   91.9  0.43 6.9 
USA  (1982-2010) 0.19 0.19   99.7  0.04 0.2 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation of the first difference in average SSC rate  
with first differences of labor wedge, two measurements 





Brinca et al. 
(2016) measure 
USA -0.07  0.06 
Germany 0.52 0.02
Sweden 0.18 -0.11 
France 0.29  0.25 
Netherlands 0.46  0.26 
United Kingdom 0.32  0.32 
Denmark 0.39  0.40 
Greece 0.29 n.a. 
Finland 0.24  0.54 
Hungary 0.05 n.a. 
Japan 0.14 -0.05 
Belgium 0.28  0.26 
Italy 0.39  0.40 
Ireland  0.10 -0.06 
Austria  0.04  0.32 
Switzerland -0.15  0.21 
Norway -0.21 -0.34 
Poland  0.48 n.a. 
Slovak Republic -0.09 n.a. 
Canada 0.30 0.05 
Czech Republic -0.11 n.a. 
New Zealand -0.03 0.10 
South Korea 0.34 0.31 
Iceland  0.23 0.25 
Spain 0.47 0.32 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Brinca et at. (2016). Note: Data are annual averages  
for quarterly indices (2008Q1=100). All data series were detrended by taking first  
differences. Authors’ data series are for 1960-2015 and the data series from Brinca  
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